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1 Introduction
After the ratification of the Kyoto protocol, European governments introduced in 2005 the
European Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) in spite of substantial political and ideological
conflicts. Some governments were indeed reluctant to make concessions, fearing that their
leading industries could be deeply impacted by a change in the regulatory framework. By
creating such a scheme, the European Union can today be considered as a worldwide pioneer
in environmental finance.1
The goal of the EU ETS is to limit the emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) by setting
a ceiling on gas emissions for energy-intensive industries. The main gases covered by the
reduction policy include carbon dioxide (CO2), nitric components (NO2), and perfluorocarbon
(CnF2n+2). In order to reach that objective, the EU ETS has been divided into several phases.
The first four phases are: 2005-2007 (phase I), 2008-2012 (phase II), 2013-2020 (phase III), and
2021-2028 (phase IV). The rules have been changing from phase to phase. For instance, during
phase I and phase II, each country subject to the EU ETS needed to implement a National
Allocation Plan (NAP) based on its sectorial capacity to pollute. Governments assessed the
amount of CO2 emitted by companies based on their respective country. Then, they created
their own industry-specific benchmark, that is, the so-called NAP. The European Commission
acted as a regulator and approved each NAP. At the starting of phase III, a EU-wide cap has
been established for all the countries of the EU ETS, which made national level plans obsolete.
This EU-wide cap is reduced by 1.74% each year in order to slowly move to renewable energy.
From a microeconomic perspective, each company has emission quotas to reach and, at
the end of the year, they must cancel out the total amount of allowances equivalent to their
emitted GHGs in tons all along the year. If their GHG emissions exceed the number of
allocated allowances, they must purchase allowances in the carbon market. If they do not
violate their allocated emission ceiling (because of an investment in cleaner technologies), they
are able to sell their surplus credits, knowing that a company can buy allowances from foreign
companies which are subject to the same trading scheme. If surplus could not be banked
from one year to another in phases I and II, phase III has introduced this possibility which
improves flexibility for companies. At the end of each year, if a company is not in possession
of enough allowances to cover all its emissions, it is required to pay heavy fines. Phase III has
also expand the use of auctions for the allocation of carbon allowances, as opposed to a free
1Kossoy and Guigon (2012) estimate the value of the European carbon market to be worth USD 24.4 billion
in 2006 and USD 176 billion (EUR 126 billion) in 2011.
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allocation mechanism, which was in place since the advent of the European carbon market.
The objective is to phase out free allocation in a near future as pollution should be financed
by the most polluting entities.
Carbon markets are now much more divided geographically than they used to. Before
phase III, trading schemes around the world included the New Zealand Emissions Trading
Scheme (NZ ETS), the New South Wales Greenhouse Gas Reduction Scheme (NSW GGAS)
in Australia, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) which is a proposal developed by
eleven states from eastern USA, the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) which is a bilateral ini-
tiative gathering some American and Canadian states from the West, and the trading scheme
of California (AB32). After the starting of phase III, the number of international emissions
trading schemes has dramatically increased and we now count 17 already in force emissions
trading systems: 7 in China, 2 in Japan, 1 in Korea, 1 in Kazakhstan, 1 in New Zealand, 3 in
Northern America and 3 in Europe. Beside these operating ETS, there are 15 more emissions
trading schemes under development. To date, the world’s biggest and leading infrastructure
in terms of trading volume is the EU ETS. Not surprisingly, the most traded carbon-related
financial assets in the world are the EUAs (European Union Allowances). Bloch (2011) indi-
cates that EUAs represent 70% of the CO2 traded in the world. The EU ETS is now covering
almost 45% of the total emissions of the 28 EU countries.
The EU ETS also allows the trading of two other assets related to the flexibility mech-
anisms and defined under the Kyoto protocol, i.e. the Emission Reduction Units (ERUs)
emitted by Joint Implementation projects (JI) and the Certified Emission Reductions (CERs)
issued by the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). These mechanisms intend to lower the
overall costs of achieving the emission targets. They take into account the fact that it could be
cheaper for a company to meet Kyoto protocol’s requirements in terms of emission reduction
by investing abroad. In particular, these mechanisms value foreign investments for the devel-
opment of cleaner technologies and enable the companies to repatriate the amount of carbon
assets associated with the foreign investments. As a matter of fact, the ultimate goal is to
reduce the emission of GHGs at a global level; the location of the GHG emissions does not
matter much as long as some “clean initiatives” are taken somewhere in the world. A win-win
situation may indeed emerge. On the one hand, the home country (or the investor) can fill
in its deficit of emission permits. On the other hand, the host country (or the subsidiary)
benefits from the transfer of technologies and foreign investments.
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All these assets (EUAs, ERUs and CERs) give the same right to its holder, i.e. the right
to emit the equivalent of one metric ton of CO2 in the atmosphere. Assets (such as EUAs)
emitted during one phase can be banked in another phase but not borrowed from future phases.
As suggested by Newell et al. (2013), carbon markets have grown at such a fast pace, started
in such a complicated financial environment (including the 2008 global financial crisis), and
faced such critical issues, that it is indeed legitimate to wonder whether these markets function
properly and are ultimately sustainable. Phase I of the EU ETS ended in a fiasco. At the
start, market participants were considering the price as a good indicator of allowances scarcity.
However, in April 2006, a few days before the publication of an official report by the European
Commission, EUA prices plummeted by more than 54% in a couple of days and ended up
being worth nearly 0. The main cause of this lethal downturn was the over-allocation of assets
assigned by the respective NAPs, which were based on erroneous forecasts rather than real
CO2 emission measurements. In phase II, EUA spot price opened at around EUR 23 and
ended at around EUR 8. All along this period, carbon prices displayed a gradual decrease
due to an oversupply of carbon assets on the one hand, and a lower demand of EUAs on the
other. The lower need for carbon permits partly resulted from the 2008 crisis and the weak
recovery of industrial companies, which were producing less and so emitting less GHGs in
the atmosphere. As in the first two phases, carbon prices have been following a similar path
in phase III. In April 2013, the European Commission hesitated to implement a backloading
plan in order to bolster the market. As a result, EUA prices, already low, plunged. In July
2013, this backloading plan was voted and carbon prices still remained shaky. In order to deal
with excessive price fluctuations, the European Commission has proposed a Market Stability
Reserve (MSR) instrument whose objective is to address imbalances in supply and demand
in the EU ETS. The European Council has also agreed to tackle the oversupply of carbon
allowances. The major change is related to the pre-defined rules and the impossibility for a
Member State to adapt them. The measure should improve the resilience of the European
carbon market to shocks by adjusting volumes for auctions, rather than focusing on allowances
prices. The Market Stability Reserve should be in force in 2019.
In 2008, around 1.6 billion EUA contracts were traded on the Intercontinental-European
Climate Exchange (ICE-ECX), which represents 96% of the total number of contracts traded
under the EU ETS. The remaining contracts were traded on the other two platforms: around
54 million contracts were traded on the NASDAQ OMX, which is equivalent to 3% of the total
volume, and around 25 million contracts on the European Energy Exchange (EEX), amounting
to 1% of the total volume (Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo, 2011). In 2013, trading volume
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rocketed but the market shares remained roughly the same. Such an unbalanced oligopoly
structure justifies the studies that have been carried out on this new derivatives market. Policy
responses to the following questions may have indeed important social welfare implications: Is
this oligopoly functioning properly or is the ECX gaining monopolistic advantages because of a
lack of integration? Are these two satellite trading platforms disconnected from the dominant
exchange? Would it be preferable to close them down to prevent any further deadweight loss?
Our study does not pretend to address all these questions, but we believe it is a first step in
the right direction.
The goal of this paper is precisely to assess the integration dynamics on the European
carbon futures market at both the intraday and daily levels. We focus on EUA futures contracts
that can be traded on the three above-mentioned trading platforms: ECX, OMX and EEX.
Even if price formation processes have been vaguely discussed in the existing literature, to the
best of our knowledge, no study has ever examined the integration dynamics on these three
exchanges using Phase II data.
Several relevant papers have been written on the EU ETS. All of them recognize that the
scheme had a tumultuous birth and that lessons can be learned from the difficulties faced in
phases I and II. Daskalakis and Markellos (2008) highlight the immaturity of the European
carbon market, as well as its weaknesses stemming from the constraints on allowances set
by policymakers, most notably on banking and short-selling operations. Bredin and Muckley
(2011) investigate whether economic factors, weather conditions as well as energy prices, have
an influence on the EU ETS prices. The results point to a turning point at the beginning of
Phase II where prices have become more related to fundamentals than in Phase I, as outlined
by Chevallier (2009). Bredin and Muckley (2011) further document this relationship, while
Chevallier (2011) shows that carbon prices negatively respond to shocks in the fundamentals.
Niblock and Harrison (2011) also underline the sensitivity of the carbon market to exogenous
events. Carbon prices have indeed been highly volatile due to a succession of exogenous events,
such as the 2008 global crisis, the European sovereign-debt crisis, the failure of the Copenhagen
Summit in 2009, and the shutdown of nuclear power stations in both Japan (following the 2011
earthquake) and Germany (due to political and public worries about nuclear safeness).2 Benz
and Truck (2009) also suggest the existence of more than one regime for price fluctuations,
consistent with Bredin and Muckley (2011), and advocate for the use of Markov switching
regimes as well as AR-GARCH specifications for carbon price modelling. Paolella and Taschini
(2008) also argue in favor of GARCH models but rather emphasize the quality of mixed-normal
2Electricity and carbon prices are highly correlated. See Keppler and Mansanet-Bataller (2010).
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GARCH models for carbon and environment-related derivatives. Rotfuß (2009) assigns a
traditional volatility U-shape to intraday carbon price patterns and a long-memory property to
daily European allowances volatility while Rittler (2012) addresses the volatility transmission
from the futures market to the spot market and concludes that the futures market leads price
discovery. Conrad et al. (2012) further investigate volatility at the intraday frequency and find
that the best model to capture these dynamics is a fractionally integrated asymmetric power
GARCH process. They further suggest that some events, including political decisions from
the European Commission regarding carbon markets, have a strong influence on the price of
carbon allowances. Although the initial idea was to create a market promoting sustainable
growth and low investment risk, the carbon market has instead turned into a highly speculative
and risky place. According to Niblock and Harrison (2011), the stability and sustainability of
the EU ETS is even at stake if these trends continue. Kossoy and Guigon (2012) however note
that “the collective demand for carbon permits and offsets has a limited impact in market
players’ trading. A considerable portion of the trades is primarily motivated by hedging,
portfolio adjustments, profit taking, and arbitrage.”
Regarding our study, the most insightful paper is Mizrach (2012) who looks at the integra-
tion of the global carbon market. His paper suggests that the spot market is fully cointegrated
in the EU ETS and the EUA futures are also cointegrated in both phases. He further outlines
a Granger causality between European and US markets. Even if this study focuses on the first
two phases, his sample ends in April 2010. Our study complements the latter one by investi-
gating the total European carbon market both at the daily and intradaily levels, using trans-
action prices and midquote prices. Benz and Hengelbrock (2008) also look at two exchanges,
use intraday prices over the 2005-2007 period, and employ the Engle-granger methodology.
Consistent with this research, Mizrach and Otsubo (2014) investigates the microstructure of
the ECX futures market and provide evidence suggesting that it drives a major part of price
discovery. They also find that the order book is informative and that a simple trading strat-
egy based on order imbalances can lead to profitable returns, even after the inclusion of the
main implicit cost components. In addition to these two papers, Medina et al. (2014) also
indicate that both market liquidity and trading activity have been improving from Phase I to
Phase II, making the carbon market more mature. In our paper, we look at three exchanges
representing the total European carbon market volume, use both daily prices (2010-2013) and
intraday quotes (2012-2013), and apply the superior cointegrated model by Johansen.3 To the
3In the Engle-Granger methodology, the cointegrated model is reduced to a single equation and there is no
statistical test on the coefficients of the long-term relationship. That is the reason why the Johansen approach
is typically preferred.
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best of our knowledge, no research study has investigated integration dynamics on the whole
market activity on EUA contracts in the second phase both at the daily and intraday levels.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the statistical
methods used in this paper. Section 3 discusses the results. The final section concludes and
provides some policy recommendations.
2 Methods
Among the three exchanges that we study, the ICE-ECX is the leading trading platform in
terms of trading activity. The NASDAQ OMX and the EEX are two smaller markets, which
are on an equal footing with respect to trading volumes. Such a market structure is expected
to have an impact on market fundamentals such as the level of volatility and the quality of
the price discovery process, as outlined by previous research.
EUA futures can take different maturity dates, the most liquid maturities being Decem-
ber, as also outlined by Mizrach and Otsubo (2014). In the empirical analysis, we focus on
the December 2013, 2014 and 2015 futures contracts traded on the three above-mentioned
exchanges. Table 1 gives a quick overview of the EUA carbon futures contract traded on the
three platforms. The December 2013 maturity is taken as an example. The data used in the
empirical analysis were collected on Bloomberg and downloaded under a unique time zone
(GMT+1). The trading day on ICE-ECX begins at 7AM until 5PM GMT and is perfectly
coordinated with trading hours on both EEX and NASDAQ OMX, going from 8AM and close
at 6PM at GMT+1. We exclude overnight intervals, pre-opening or post-closing periods in
order to focus on the carbon market when there is continuous trading on all platforms.
We do not use intraday transaction prices because transactions are not filled simultaneously
on the three exchanges, as expected. For instance, a high volume can be traded on one platform
while no transaction occurs in the other two exchanges. We therefore use daily data on trades
because there is no synchronization issue at the daily frequency. There is indeed at least one
transaction per day on each platform. For the December 2013 contract, data on transaction
prices are available from June 29 2010 to March 11 2013. For the December 2014 contract,
the time period ranges from June 29 2010 to April 15 2013. Finally, it goes from June 11 2012
to April 12 2013 for the December 2015 contract.
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Figure 1 presents the time series of the transaction prices and the corresponding log returns
for the December 2013, 2014, and 2015 futures contracts on the three trading platforms. The
first / second / third column refers to the ICE-ECX / NASDAQ OMX / EEX platform, with
the corresponding Bloomberg ticker (MOZ / FUAZ / UJLZ, respectively). Table 2 reports
the key descriptive statistics on the log returns. In Table 3, we measure the unconditional and
GARCH-type volatilities on the three exchanges for the three futures contracts. A quick look
at the volatilities confirms that the carbon market is very volatile indeed. GARCH volatilities
are higher than unconditional volatilities but there is no systematic difference in volatility
between the three exchanges.
By using bid and ask quotes, we are also able to look at the integration dynamics between
the three markets at the intraday level. There is indeed no synchronization issue for bid and
ask quotes since they are always displayed when the market is open, irrespective of whether
there is a transaction on the platform or not. In addition, by using the midquote instead of
the transaction price, we avoid the intraday bouncing of trade prices between the bid and ask.
We use hourly data on midquotes in the empirical analysis. For the three futures contracts,
intraday data on bid and ask quotes are available from August 8 2012 to April 4 2013.
All in all, the two types of data (on daily transaction prices and intraday bid-ask quotes) are
complementary. On the one hand, daily data on trades are useful because they represent real
transactions between market participants. On the other hand, intraday data on midquotes are
useful because it is possible to take a micro perspective on the degree of integration between
the markets by avoiding at the same time the “no synchronization” and “bid-ask bounce”
issues.
In Table 4, we report the median for three key measures of liquidity: The proportional
spread (PropSpread), the volume spread (V olSpread) and the quote slope (QuoteSlope).




















t id) is the
quantity available at the ask (bid) at time t.
Compared to traditional stock markets, liquidity on the European carbon market is sig-
nificantly lower, even if it is improving with time. Among the three exchanges, we find that
ICE-ECX is the most liquid exchange, irrespective of the liquidity measure considered. We
do not observe any significant difference between the NASDAQ OMX and EEX platforms in
terms of liquidity. When futures contracts are compared, the December 2013 contract is the
most liquid contract on each of the three trading platforms. This is confirmed for each of
the three liquidity measures. As for traditional future contracts, the nearest maturity date is
most of the time the most liquid one in carbon markets, even if particular attention is paid to
December futures, as outlined by Mizrach and Otsubo (2014).
We estimate the integration dynamics of the European carbon futures market by using
a Vector Autoregressive Correction Model (VECM). This model allows us to test for coin-
tegration, i.e. to estimate the long run (no-arbitrage) equilibrium between the three futures
markets. In our study, we investigate the daily log price dynamics of EUA futures on three
different exchanges. We also carry out a similar analysis for intraday bid-ask quotes. In both
cases, the number of variables in the VECM is equal to 3 (g = 3).
If the carbon market is not dysfunctional, a long-run (i.e. no-arbitrage) equilibrium must be
found. We therefore expect to find a statistically significant cointegration vector for both price
and quote variations on the three exchanges, with the appropriate coefficient signs. When the
market price reflects the long run price equilibrium, mean-reversion dynamics in transaction
prices cannot be exploited. In such a case, deviations from the no-arbitrage equilibrium (i.e.
long-run disequilibrium effects) and short-run time dependencies in prices (induced by market
imperfections) cannot help explain current returns and do not bear on the price discovery
process.
In the cointegrated model by Johansen, the general VECM can be written as
∆pt =
∏
pt−k + Γ1∆pt−1 + Γ2∆pt−2 + ...+ Γk−1∆pt−(k−1) + εt, (2.4)










j=1 βi) − Ig and Γi = ((
∑i
j=1 βi) − Ig. The Γi coefficients
measure the short-run effects as captured by lagged returns.
∏
is a long-run coefficient matrix
and shows how the prices come to a new long-run equilibrium after a shock. The movement
back to equilibrium is the direct result of the prices being cointegrated.
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The first step of our cointegration analysis consists in identifying the most appropriate
model given the features of the data. There are several candidate models which differ accord-
ing to the inclusion of a constant and/or a deterministic component (in the model and/or the
cointegration vector). In fact, cointegration and price discovery between markets are studied
by using a model with no deterministic trend in the cointegrating vector. Adding a deter-
ministic trend is indeed not justified since price series are integrated of order 1; we instead
differentiate them to take the stochastic trend into account. The typical model also incorpo-
rates an unrestricted constant in the general equation but not in the cointegrating vector (as
in deB Harris et al. (1995), Booth et al. (1999)). The unrestricted constant in the general
equation may be useful when the average price variations are superior to zero.
The second step requires testing for the cointegration rank (r) of the VAR system to
determine whether there are potentially useful cointegrating vectors. This is typically done
by running the trace and maximum eigenvalue tests by Johansen (1988) and Johansen (1991)
which are robust to non-normal errors and GARCH effects (Cheung and Lai, 1993; Lee and Tse,
1996). The critical values for the Johansen tests are given in Johansen (1991) and Osterwald-
Lenum (1992).
The third step involves the determination of the number of lags (k) in the multivariate
model. It is determined so that the last included k + 1 lagged variables in the VAR specifica-
tion are jointly non-significant. Moreover, we compute the usual univariate and multivariate
diagnostic tests and examine the Schwarz Information Criteria (SIC).
If there is one cointegration relationship between the three exchanges with k = 1, the
VECM can be rewritten as:
∆p1,t = α1 + δ1(p1,t−1 + β2p2,t−1 + β3p3,t−1) + γ11∆p1,t−1 + γ12∆p2,t−1 + γ13∆p3,t−1 + ε1,t,
∆p2,t = α2 + δ2(p1,t−1 + β2p2,t−1 + β3p3,t−1) + γ21∆p1,t−1 + γ22∆p2,t−1 + γ23∆p3,t−1 + ε2,t,
∆p3,t = α3 + δ3(p1,t−1 + β2p2,t−1 + β3p3,t−1) + γ31∆p1,t−1 + γ32∆p2,t−1 + γ33∆p3,t−1 + ε3,t.
(2.5)
The above VECM relates to the model specification with no trend and an unrestricted
constant in the equations. If subscripts 1, 2, and 3 point to the ICE-ECX, NASDAQ OMX, and
EEX exchanges respectively, then ICE-ECX is the “benchmark” exchange since β1 ≡ 1. When
evidence of cointegration is found, we can study the magnitude and statistical significance of
the reversion dynamics between the prices (and quotes) on these exchanges.
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First, we investigate whether a deviation from the long-run equilibrium between these
three exchanges has an impact on prices (and quotes) so that they revert to their long-run
equilibrium in a statistical and predictable way, implying that arbitrage opportunities may be
possible. This will be indicated by the adjustment speed coefficients (i.e. δ1, δ2, δ3) which
determine how each price (or quote) is affected by the disequilibrium in the lagged long-run
relationship.
Second, we examine short-term reversion dynamics. Although the disequilibrium in the
lagged long-run relationship may not bear on reversion dynamics, it may still be possible to
find and exploit short-term price (or quote) time dependence to design arbitrage strategies.
This will be indicated by the significance of the gamma coefficients in the VECM.
Third, we test for the presence of indirect effects between the three exchanges, since the
relationship between market pairs may not be fully informative. We also use the forecast
error variance decomposition (FEVD) technique to further explore the trivariate relationships.
FEVD gives the proportion of the movements in the dependent variables that are due to their
“own” shocks, versus shocks to the other variables. Finally, we complement the analysis by
computing impulse responses (IRs) to one standard deviation Cholesky’s innovations. IR
functions show the effects of both internal and external shocks on the adjustment path of the
dependent variable in each exchange.
3 Results and Discussion
Table 5 clearly indicates that the three exchanges are cointegrated since up to two vectors
of cointegration are identified, as indicated by both the trace and maximum eigenvalue tests.
In other words, the three exchanges share a long-run price equilibrium and are impacted by
one common stochastic factor. The European carbon market is therefore not dysfunctional,
at least at first sight and from a statistical point of view. The lag length selection procedure
based on the SIC indicates that the optimal number of lags in the VECM is equal to 1 in
almost all cases. There is one exception where k = 3, for December 2015 contracts when the
midquote dynamics are studied.
In Table 6, we use transaction prices and report the estimates for the long-term relation-
ships characterized by the cointegrating vector, including the adjustment speed coefficients.
Let us first focus on daily transaction prices (Table 6) and take the case of the December 2013
futures contract. The first two lines correspond to the case where the ICE-ECX exchange is
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used as the benchmark (as it was assumed in the example above). The first equation in the
VECM characterizes the price variations in the ICE-ECX platform. It can be written as:
∆p1,t = α1 − 0.025661(p1,t−1 − 14.43992p2,t−1 + 13.43961p3,t−1) + STdynamics+ ε1,t. (3.1)
Under the hypothesis of long-run equilibrium, the equilibrium errors equate to zero. In
such a case, p1 = p2 = p3 and no arbitrage profit can be made. This arbitrage-free equality
of the three prices in synchronous trading is reflected by the finding that literally each of the
cointegrating vectors sums to approximately zero. For example,
(p1,t−1 − 14.43992p2,t−1 + 13.43961p3,t−1) ≈ 0. (3.2)
If there is any disequilibrium, mean-reversion dynamics will play through the adjustment
speed coefficient. Its estimate is δˆ1 = −0.025661. Let us suppose that the futures price on ICE-
ECX has recently fallen “too much” with respect to its long-term equilibrium. Then, (p1,t−1
is “too low” and the value of the cointegrating vector is negative. Because the adjustment
coefficient estimate is also negative (but insignificant), the mean-reversion dynamics will help
correct this punctual disequilibrium by pushing ∆p1,t higher. If the adjustment speed coeffi-
cient estimate is close to one (with the sign opposite to the disequilibrium), then it disappears
after one day only, ceteris paribus.
In Table 6, we observe that most cointegrating vectors’ coefficients are statistically signif-
icant at 1%, which corroborates the presence of a long-term relationship between daily log
prices on these three exchanges. Consequently, the three markets seem to be informationally
connected, with arbitrage being the mechanism by which this connection is realized. The prices
of these contracts should therefore not drift apart in the long run on these exchanges. There
are nevertheless some variations between exchanges. The “price leading” exchange seems to be
ECX since all cointegrating factors are significant when the price deviation from the long-run
equilibrium occurs on that platform. It holds irrespective of the contract maturity. On the
contrary, a price deviation on the OMX platform does not significantly affect ECX prices for
the 2013 and 2014 contracts. It is also the case between the EEX and the ECX, but only for
the 2013 maturity. The OMX exchange seems to exhibit some lack of integration with respect
to the other two platforms.
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Clearly, arbitrage forces are stronger between exchanges when the price deviation comes
from the ECX because the cointegrating coefficients on the other two platforms are always
statistically significant. On the contrary, the no-arbitrage argument, which leads to long-
run equilibrium price levels between these three exchanges, is weakened when the deviation
occurs on OMX, suggesting that price deviations may potentially last for a long time in this
case. Regarding the adjustment coefficients, we notice that none is statistically significant at
5%, which implies that there is no substantial price adjustment in maintaining the long-run
cross-exchange equilibrium from one day to another on these exchanges. When the long-run
cross-exchange relationship has been perturbed by the arrival of news the day before, there is
no noticeable price effect on the next day closing price on these trading platforms.
Overall, there is very weak evidence that arbitrage profit can be made by attempting to
exploit long-term disequilibria in transaction prices on a daily basis between these platforms
since no significant price adjustment can be anticipated at the daily level to restore long-run
equilibrium. It takes less than a day to incorporate new information and go back to the long-
run equilibrium. As indicated in Table 7, there is no price discovery that can be captured at
the daily interval when we focus on short-run (cross-exchange) daily effects. No lagged price
change displays a significant coefficient estimate. Based on daily log transaction prices, two
conclusions can be drawn. First, the price levels on these three platforms are bounded by a
long-run no-arbitrage relationship, with OMX being the weakest link. Second, daily changes
in log transaction prices on (and between) these exchanges follow a random walk. We conclude
that daily transaction prices are close to the long run price equilibrium since no evidence of
price discovery is found: Mean-reversion dynamics in transaction prices cannot be exploited.
Results for hourly mid quotes in Tables 8 and 9 give us additional insight into the dynamics
of price discovery on these three exchanges. For the three futures contracts, the cointegrating
vector coefficients are all statistically significant, confirming that the prices of these contracts
should therefore not drift apart in the long run on these exchanges. Most interestingly, the
adjustment speed coefficients are statistically significant in many cases. Contrary to daily log
prices, there is evidence of mean-reversion dynamics in hourly log mid quotes, following a
deviation from the no-arbitrage equilibrium. Conclusions vary across futures contracts. For
the December 2013 contract, our VECM results for hourly mid quotes shows that long-run
price discovery occurs on all three markets, with no statistical difference between the three
exchanges. Nevertheless, the EEX displays the highest absolute adjustment coefficient values,
responding faster to deviations from the no-arbitrage equilibrium.
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Regarding the December 2014 contract, when the arrival of news perturbs the cointegrating
relationship, the adjustment process required to restore equilibrium is mainly done by the ECX
exchange. The absolute values of the adjustment speed coefficients on ECX are much higher,
implying that the ECX responds much faster than the other two platforms. There is actually
no long-run price discovery on EEX and OMX. Results for the 2014 and 2015 contracts are
similar, with the difference that the EEX displays significant adjustment coefficients. They
remain lower than those of the ECX.
In Table 9, we display the short-term dynamics of the VECM based on hourly mid quotes
and investigate the sensitivity of prices to their lagged values. Short-run price discovery is
much more pervasive when hourly mid-quotes are used than daily transaction prices. Short-
run price effects seem to decrease with the maturity of the contract and be weakest on the
OMX platform.
Although the relationship between market pairs is instructive, indirect effects could exist.
For example, the OMX may not influence the ECX directly, but it may influence it indirectly
through the EEX. This hypothesis is examined by testing the null that for a given platform,
there are no price effects coming from the other two platforms. For example, we can test under
the null whether the OMX and EEX platforms do not offer useful information for the pricing
of the ECX. If they do, the null is rejected. Useful information is captured by the lagged
returns of the OMX and the EEX, but also their error correction terms. Based on the Wald
statistics reported in Table 10, the null is rejected, suggesting the likelihood of indirect effects,
in all cases, except for the 2014 contract on the OMX platform.
We use the forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) to further explore the trivariate
relationships. FEVD gives the proportion of the movements in the dependent variables that
are due to their “own” shocks, versus shocks to the other variables. Thus, Table 11 shows the
fraction of the forecast error variance that is attributable to the “own” shocks for horizons
ranging from 1 to 20 periods. For example, estimates for the 2013 contract after 20 periods
indicate that the common factor explains 83.50%, 64.96%, and 50.88% of ECX’s, OMX’s, and
EEX’s fluctuations, respectively. The more the price movement is explained by the “own”
shocks, the more “self-sufficient” the exchange is. For the 2013 contract, we can also observe
that shocks on the OMX and EEX explain a relatively high percentage of the variation in
hourly log mid quotes on the ECX (at 33.73% and 48.04%, respectively). The percentages
are much lower in the opposite way (at 16.11% and 0.39%, respectively). The transmission
of “cross-exchange” shocks coming from the EEX (or OMX) platform to the ECX market is
13
thus more important than the reverse. In other words, the ECX is better at capturing (and
transmitting) more quickly and more extensively “outside” information (proxied by shocks
coming from another market). If we focus on the two satellite markets, the “cross-exchange”
transmission between them is very limited. Following a shock on the OMX market, the EEX
platform can only explain 1.3% of the total error variance observed in the OMX midquotes
after 20 periods. In the same vein, following a shock on the EEX market, the OMX platform
can only explain 1.08% of the total error variance observed in the EEX midquotes after 20
periods. These results are insensitive to the ordering switch between the second and third
places, irrespective of the column in Table 11. We do not show them to avoid redundancy but
they are available upon request.
We also report the impulse responses (IRs) to one standard deviation Cholesky’s inno-
vations. IR functions show the effects of shocks on the adjustment path of the dependent
variable over the next 10 periods. Figure 2 clearly shows that ECX and EEX market quotes
react to each other’s shocks in a rather similar way. In both cases, the impulse responses are
nearly identical and stable after 4 periods. Market quotes on EEX even seem to be slightly
more reactive than those on ECX. Regarding the OMX platform, market quotes react more
to external innovations than to internal ones (as indicated by the crossed line being below
the other two lines, on the middle graph). Also, innovations in the OMX quotes affect the
adjustment path of the ECX and EEX quotes to a much lower extent than the reverse (which
means that innovations in the ECX and EEX quotes affect the adjustment path of the OMX
market quotes to a much higher extent, as shown on the middle graph).
For the December 2013 contract, the ECX trading platform seems to display the most
attractive quote dynamics, but the EEX market does not lag much behind, given its smaller
market share. Nevertheless, the lower level of interconnectedness displayed by the OMX
platform is more worrisome. If we had to rank the three markets in terms of integration
dynamics for this contract, it would be ECX, EEX, and then OMX quite behind.
For the 2014 and 2015 contracts, there is almost no noticeable “cross-exchange” effect
between exchanges. The proportion of the movements in the dependent variables that are due
to their “own” shocks is particularly high on the OMX and EEX. The only significant indirect
effect is the shock transmission from ECX to OMX, which reveals a weaker integration at
these two maturities.
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4 Conclusions and Policy Implications
To study the integration dynamics on the European carbon market, we focus on the analysis
of three EUA futures contracts that can be traded on three different trading platforms: The
Intercontinental-European Climate Exchange (ICE-ECX), the NASDAQ OMX (formerly Nord
Pool) and the European Energy Exchange (EEX). To the best of our knowledge, this study is
the first to examine the integration dynamics between these three exchanges using Phase II
data, both at the daily and intraday levels. Given the unbalanced oligopoly structure of this
market, it is important to provide policymakers and regulators with insightful information that
may help them better evaluate the functioning of these new exchanges. This study contributes
to this effort.
We use both daily transaction prices and hourly mid quotes because these two types of
data are complementary. On the one hand, daily data on trades are useful because they
represent real transactions between market participants. On the other hand, intraday data
on mid quotes are useful because it is possible to take a micro perspective on the degree of
integration between the markets by avoiding at the same time the “no synchronization” and
“bid-ask bounce” issues.
First, we estimate liquidity on these three exchanges by computing three measures: The
proportional spread, the spread on volume, and the quote slope. The ICE-ECX exchange
is the most liquid exchange, irrespective of the liquidity measure considered. We do not
observe any significant difference between the NASDAQ OMX and EEX platforms in terms
of liquidity. When futures contracts are compared, the December 2013 contract is the most
liquid contract on each of the three trading platforms. This is confirmed for each of the three
liquidity measures.
Second, we estimate volatility both unconditionally and conditionally. We find that the
carbon market is very volatile indeed, with GARCH volatilities being higher than unconditional
volatilities. There is also no systematic difference in volatility between the three exchanges
Third, the study of price dynamics at the daily level indicates that the ECX platform seems
to drive the integration dynamics between the three exchanges. When there is a shock to the
long-run equilibrium coming from the ECX, arbitrage forces are stronger since the ECX is the
only platform for which all the cointegrating factors (related to the other two exchanges) are
significant, irrespective of the contract maturity. On the contrary, the no-arbitrage argument,
which leads to long-run equilibrium price levels between these three exchanges, is weakened
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when the shock occurs on the OMX, suggesting that price deviations may potentially last for
a long time in this case.
We find that there is no substantial price adjustment in maintaining the long-run cross-
exchange equilibrium from one day to another on these two exchanges. When the long-run
cross-exchange relationship has been perturbed by the arrival of news the day before, there
is no noticeable price effect on the next day closing price on these trading platforms. The
adjustment dynamics towards a new long-run price equilibrium, i.e. the so-called long-run
price discovery, would occur at another frequency. The same conclusion can be drawn by
looking at the short-run price dynamics. There is no short-run price discovery. Daily changes
in log transaction prices on (and between) these exchanges follow a random walk.
Finally, we obtain additional insight into the dynamics of integration and price discov-
ery on these three exchanges by looking at hourly mid quotes. We note that the integration
level is stronger at this higher frequency. For each of the three futures contracts, the coin-
tegrating vector coefficients are always statistically significant. Contrary to daily log prices,
there is evidence of mean-reversion dynamics in hourly log mid quotes when a deviation from
the no-arbitrage equilibrium occurs. When the arrival of news perturbs the long-run cross-
exchange relationship, the adjustment process required to restore equilibrium is done by the
ECX exchange but the EEX exchange also plays an important role. The absolute values of
the adjustment speed coefficients are overall relatively high, implying a rather fast response
to any long run disequilibrium. Short-run price discovery is also much more pervasive when
hourly mid-quotes are used instead of daily transaction prices. Variance decompositions show
that the ECX exchange is the most “self-sufficient” exchange. The ECX is also better at cap-
turing (and transmitting) more quickly and more extensively “outside” information (proxied
by shocks coming from another market). If we focus on the two satellite markets, the “cross-
exchange” transmission between them is very limited. Through the use of impulse responses,
we also show that innovations in the OMX quotes affect the adjustment path of the ECX and
EEX quotes to a much lower extent than the reverse. If we had to rank the three markets in
terms of integration dynamics for the 2013 contract, it would ECX, EEX, and then OMX quite
behind. Overall, we also reveal a lower level of interconnection between the three platforms at
the 2014 and 2015 contracts.
In conclusion, we find that the European carbon derivatives market exhibits a reasonable
level of integration between the ECX and EEX platforms at the shorter maturities, with the
price discovery process occurring at the hourly frequency. This market still needs to be closely
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monitored by the regulatory authorities given the high level of volatility, the fragile level of
liquidity, the relatively weak interconnectedness of the OMX exchange, and the lower level of
interconnection at longer maturities.
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Table 2: Log returns for the three futures contracts on the three platforms - Descriptive
statistics
Dec-13 Dec-14 Dec-15
ECX OMX EEX ECX OMX EEX ECX OMX EEX
Mean -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0009
Median -0.0005 0.0002 0.0000 -0.0005 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0005 0.0000
Higher 0.1035 0.0933 0.1019 0.1005 0.0933 0.0971 0.0992 0.0958 0.0971
Lower -0.0689 -0.0717 -0.0671 -0.0683 -0.0717 -0.0666 -0.0662 -0.0677 -0.0654
Stand. dev. 0.0183 0.0186 0.0182 0.0181 0.0184 0.0180 0.0179 0.0193 0.0178
Skewness 0.5350 0.2346 0.5600 0.4816 0.2179 0.4699 0.4780 0.4139 0.5209
Kurtosis 4.9663 3.7402 4.8634 4.6981 3.8906 4.3567 4.6235 3.6459 4.5827
Table 3: Unconditional and GARCH-type volatilities for the three futures contracts on the
three platforms
Transaction ECX OMX EEX
prices Daily Volatility Daily Volatility Daily Volatility
Dec-13 Stand. Dev. (unconditional) 1.83% 29.06% 1.85% 29.30% 1.81% 28.81%
Stand. Dev. (GARCH) 1.94% 30.76% 1.87% 29.61% 2.03% 32.23%
Dec-14 Stand. Dev. (unconditional) 1.81% 28.79% 1.84% 29.18% 1.80% 28.54%
Stand. Dev. (GARCH) 1.91% 30.36% 2.30% 36.52% 1.95% 30.92%
Dec-15 Stand. Dev. (unconditional) 1.79% 28.49% 1.92% 30.55% 1.77% 28.13%
Stand. Dev. (GARCH) 1.92% 30.41% 2.30% 36.47% 1.97% 31.30%
Volatility is presented on an annual basis.
Table 4: Liquidity of the three futures contracts on the three platforms
Proportional spread Spread on volume Quote slope
Dec-13 ECX OMX EEX ECX OMX EEX ECX OMX EEX
Median 0.0042 0.0085 0.0083 0.0000 0.0087 0.0088 0.0020 0.0046 0.0032
Dec-14 ECX OMX EEX ECX OMX EEX ECX OMX EEX
Median 0.0058 0.0081 0.0098 0.0005 0.0305 0.0190 0.0027 0.0048 0.0043
Dec-15 ECX OMX EEX ECX OMX EEX ECX OMX EEX
Median 0.0066 0.0174 0.0115 0.0013 0.0239 0.1850 0.0033 0.0137 0.0072
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Figure 1: Transaction prices and log returns for the three futures contracts on the three




Panel a, b and c present the time series of the transaction prices on the first line and the corresponding log returns on
the second line for the Dec 2013, 2014, 2015 futures contracts respectively. The first / second / third column refers to the
ICE-ECX / NASDAQ OMX / EEX platform, respectively (with the corresponding Bloomberg tickers: MOZ / FUAZ /
UJLZ).
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Table 5: VECM Model selection Rank of the VECM
Daily Trade prices Intraday Mid quotes
Maturity Dec-13 Dec-14 Dec-15 Dec-13 Dec-14 Dec-15
SIC -20.84 -20.60 -19.42 -11.09 -12.06 -12.12
Optimal K 1 1 1 1 1 3
Data None None None None None None
VECM Trend
Coint. No Intercept No Intercept No Intercept No Intercept No Intercept No Intercept
Vector No Trend No Trend No Trend No Trend No Trend No Trend
Nb of Trace test 2 2 2 2 2 2
coint. Max. Eigen
vectors value 2 2 2 2 2 2
Table 6: VECM long-term dynamics of daily log transaction prices
Trade Benchmark Cointegrating vector
prices exchanges β1 β2 β3 δ1 δ2 δ3
Maturity ECX (1) 1.0000 -14.4400*** 13.4396*** -0.0257 0.05561* -0.0150
Dec-13 (0.7837) (0.7836) (0.0329) (0.0327) (0.0325)
OMX (2) -0.0693 1.0000 -0.9307*** -0.3705 -0.8029* 0.2168
(0.0562) (0.0562) (0.4757) (0.4719) (0.4686)
EEX (3) 0.0744 -1.0744*** 1.0000 0.3449 0.747329* -0.2018
(0.0672) (0.0672) (0.4428) (0.4393) (0.4362)
Maturity ECX (1) 1.0000 2.5107*** -3.5098*** -0.0848 -0.1937 0.0973
Dec-14 (0.1788) (0.1788) (0.1283) (0.1273) (0.1260)
OMX (2) 0.3983 1.0000 -1.3980*** -0.2129 -0.4862 0.2443
(0.0853) (0.0853) (0.3222) (0.3195) (0.3163)
EEX (3) -0.2849*** -0.7153*** 1.0000 0.2977 0.6797 -0.3415
(0.0584) (0.0584) (0.4504) (0.4466) (0.4421)
Maturity ECX (1) 1.0000 1.8401*** -2.8388*** -0.3824 -0.4605 -0.0917
Dec-15 (0.2648) (0.2647) (0.3685) (0.3654) (0.3597)
OMX (2) 0.5434*** 1.0000 -1.5427*** -0.7036 -0.8473 -0.1687
(0.1575) (0.1573) (0.6781) (0.6723) (0.6619)
EEX (3) -0.3523*** -0.6482*** 1.0000 1.0855 1.3071 0.2603
(0.1184) (0.1183) (1.0461) (1.0372) (1.0212)
Subscripts 1, 2, and 3 relate to ICE-ECX, NASDAQ OMX, and EEX exchanges, respectively.
Table 7: VECM short-term dynamics of daily log transaction prices
Dec-13 Dec-14 Dec-15
∆p1,t ∆p2,t ∆p3,t ∆p1,t ∆p2,t ∆p3,t ∆p1,t ∆p2,t ∆p3,t
∆p1,t−1 -0.2772 0.2488 0.2055 0.0871 0.6003* 0.4459 0.5486 1.0220 0.9193
(0.3528) (0.3500) (0.3475) (0.3283) (0.3255) (0.3223) (0.7709) (0.7643) (0.7525)
∆p2,t−1 0.3868 0.0689 0.1320 0.2777 -0.0312 0.0865 0.2565 -0.1506 -0.0083
(0.3752) (0.3722) (0.3696) (0.3123) (0.3097) (0.3066) (0.7353) (0.7290) (0.7178)
∆p3,t−1 -0.0715 -0.2763 -0.2932 -0.3395 -0.5268 -0.4977 -0.7327 -0.7888 -0.8330
(0.3502) (0.3474) (0.3449) (0.3464) (0.3435) (0.3401) (0.7430) (0.7366) (0.7253)
Subscripts 1, 2, and 3 relate to ICE-ECX, NASDAQ OMX, and EEX exchanges, respectively. To save space, we only
report the short-term dynamics when ICE-ECX is taken as the benchmark exchange.
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Table 8: VECM long-term dynamics of hourly log mid quotes
Mid Benchmark Cointegrating vector
quotes exchanges β1 β2 β3 δ1 δ2 δ3
Maturity ECX (1) 1 -0.3393*** -0.6608*** -0.38*** 0.8328*** 0.9606***
Dec-13 (0.0523) (0.0523) (0.0327) (0.0462) (0.0452)
OMX (2) -2.9474*** 1 1.9475*** 0.1289*** -0.2826*** -0.3259***
(0.0902) (0.0903) (0.0111) (0.0157) (0.0153)
EEX (3) -1.5134*** 0.5135*** 1 0.2511*** -0.5503*** -0.6347***
(0.0483) (0.0483) (0.0216) (0.0305) (0.0298)
Maturity ECX (1) 1 -0.1082*** -0.8919*** -0.9143*** 0.0027 0.0131
Dec-14 (0.0227) (0.0227) (0.0414) (0.0828) (0.0774)
OMX (2) -9.2403*** 1 8.2418*** 0.0989*** -0.0003 -0.0014
(0.2439) (0.2441) (0.0045) (-0.009) (0.0084)
EEX (3) -1.1212*** 0.1213*** 1 0.8155*** -0.0024 -0.0117
(0.0209) (0.0209) (0.0369) (0.0739) (0.0691)
Maturity ECX (1) 1 -2.0995*** 1.1002*** -0.3307*** 0.0782 -0.2215***
Dec-15 (0.1046) (0.1046) (0.0296) (0.0893) (0.0851)
OMX (2) -0.4763*** 1 -0.524*** 0.6944*** -0.1641 0.4651***
(0.0335) (0.0335) (0.0621) (0.1874) (0.1786)
EEX (3) 0.9089*** -1.9083*** 1 -0.3639*** 0.086 -0.2437***
(0.0664) (0.0663) (0.0325) (0.0982) (0.0936)
Subscripts 1, 2, and 3 relate to ICE-ECX, NASDAQ OMX, and EEX exchanges, respectively.
Table 9: VECM short-term dynamics of hourly log mid quotes
Mid Dec-13 Dec-14 Dec-15
quotes ∆p1,t ∆p2,t ∆p3,t ∆p1,t ∆p2,t ∆p3,t ∆p1,t ∆p2,t ∆p3,t
∆p1,t−1 0.0456** 0.1541*** 0.1447*** 0.0856*** 0.0768** 0.1296*** -0.1747*** -0.1521 0.0108
(0.0217) (0.0307) (-0.03) (0.0194) (0.0387) (0.0362) (0.0318) (-0.096) (0.0915)
∆p2,t−1 0.3250*** 0.1069** 0.5744*** 0.2094*** 0.1179* 0.4277*** -0.2301*** -0.026 0.1684
(0.0318) (-0.045) (-0.044) (0.0302) (0.0605) (0.0566) (0.0574) (0.1733) (0.1651)
∆p3,t−1 0.0615* 0.4293*** 0.0722* -0.1397*** -0.033 -0.3268*** 0.8369*** 0.2601** -0.2580**
(0.0315) (0.0445) (0.0436) (0.0387) (0.0775) (0.0724) (0.0383) (0.1157) (0.1102)
To save space, we only report the short-term dynamics for the first lag, when ECX is taken as the benchmark exchange.
Table 10: Indirect effects (on hourly log mid quotes)
Dec-13 Dec-14 Dec-15
Null Hypothesis (H0) Wald Stat P-value Wald Stat P-value Wald Stat P-value
ECX returns not affected by OMX and EEX 243.6788 <0.0001 48.7989 <0.0001 5936.561 <0.0001
OMX returns not affected by ECX and EEX 143.2052 <0.0001 3.97939 0.1367 20.6936 <0.01
EEX returns not affected by ECX and OMX 229.1883 <0.0001 75.4171 <0.0001 55.5212 <0.0001
The Wald statistics are calculated using Newey and West’s heteroskedascity and autocorrelation consistent variance-
covariance matrix. The null model includes only own index security effects (i.e., own lags). In this application the test
statistics are χ2(12) distributed.
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Table 11: Accounting for Innovations and Variance decompositions (on hourly log mid quotes)
Horizon Dec-13
(in periods)
Ordering: ECX/OMX/EEX Ordering: OMX/ECX/EEX Ordering: EEX/ECX/OMX
ECX OMX EEX OMX ECX EEX EEX ECX OMX
1 100 0 0 100 0 0 100 0 0
2 72.39 25.68 1.93 83.93 15.88 0.18 76.11 23.1 0.79
3 76.07 22.46 1.47 77.52 21.84 0.63 67.16 31.97 0.88
4 78.1 20.8 1.09 73.4 25.79 0.81 61.78 37.26 0.96
5 79.69 19.43 0.89 71.08 27.97 0.95 58.74 40.27 0.99
10 82.43 17.05 0.53 66.81 32 1.2 53.25 45.7 1.05
20 83.5 16.11 0.39 64.96 33.73 1.3 50.88 48.04 1.08
Horizon Dec-14
(in periods)
Ordering: ECX/OMX/EEX Ordering: OMX/ECX/EEX Ordering: EEX/ECX/OMX
ECX OMX EEX OMX ECX EEX EEX ECX OMX
1 100 0 0 100 0 0 100 0 0
2 76.14 20.07 3.79 99.98 0.02 0.01 98.64 0.21 1.16
3 71.43 24.74 3.82 99.98 0.01 0.01 98.61 0.15 1.24
4 69.46 26.61 3.93 99.98 0.01 0.01 98.51 0.12 1.37
5 68.46 27.57 3.97 99.99 0.01 0.01 98.47 0.1 1.43
10 66.81 29.16 4.03 99.99 0.01 0.01 98.38 0.08 1.55
20 66.14 29.8 4.06 99.99 0 0.01 98.34 0.06 1.6
Horizon Dec-15
(in periods)
Ordering: ECX/OMX/EEX Ordering: OMX/ECX/EEX Ordering: EEX/ECX/OMX
ECX OMX EEX OMX ECX EEX EEX ECX OMX
1 100 0 0 100 0 0 100 0 0
2 65.51 33.18 1.32 99.63 0.073 0.3 98.74 0.06 1.19
3 57.84 41.46 0.7 99.09 0.25 0.66 98.61 0.35 1.04
4 55.01 44.41 0.58 98.89 0.3 0.81 98.54 0.43 1.03
5 53.81 45.7 0.49 98.82 0.33 0.85 98.45 0.49 1.05
10 51.98 47.69 0.34 98.68 0.38 0.94 98.33 0.59 1.08
20 51.25 48.47 0.28 98.61 0.41 0.98 98.28 0.63 1.09
Entries are fractions of the forecast error variance at horizon h that are attributable to common factor shocks (with three
different orderings).
Figure 2: Impulse responses to Choleski one S.D. Innovations
The three graphs present the responses to Choleski one S.D. Innovations for December 2013 contracts on the three
exchanges. The chosen order is ECX/OMX/EEX, but the results are absolutely insensitive to any order switch.
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